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Abstract 
What explains which groups are included in a party coalition in any given election cycle? Recent 
advances in political party theory suggest that policy demanders comprise parties, and that the 
composition of a party coalition varies from election to election. We theorize three conditions 
under which parties articulate an interest group’s preferred positions in its quadrennial platform: 
when groups are ideologically proximate to the party median, when groups display party loyalty, 
and when groups are flush with resources. Using computer-assisted content analysis on a unique 
and rich data source, we examine three cycles of testimony that 80 organized groups provided to 
the Democratic Party. The analysis compares group requests with the content of Democratic and 
Republican National Committee platforms in 1996, 2000, and 2004. Results show that parties 
reward loyal groups and those that are ideologically proximate to the party, but offer no 
confirmation of a resource effect. 
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During the 1996 GOP Convention, Presidential candidate Bob Dole met conflict with 
pro-life advocates. The Platform Committee had adopted a strongly pro-life plank in the 
platform, but Dole favored a statement of tolerance that might appeal to party moderates. Though 
trying to foster a sentiment of compromise, Dole confronted a platform committee stacked with 
grassroots activists from the Christian Coalition, and his efforts ultimately failed (Rozell et al 
2012). 
Studying the complexities of the relationship between political parties and organized 
interests has generated scholarship that describes these entities as distinct (Key 1964), competing 
(Sabato 1981), dependent (Kolodny & Dulio 2003), or fully enmeshed (Cohen et al 2008). These 
arguments, in light of stories such as above, lead us to explore the US platform-drafting process 
and ask: Under what conditions will a party include a group in its coalition via the party 
platform? 
American political parties publicly articulate their ideological positions in quadrennial 
platforms, adopted in presidential nominating conventions. Organized groups seek to join the 
party coalition by having their interests articulated via platform planks. Parties may use these 
platforms to appeal to undecided voters (ideological moderates), or to boost enthusiasm (and 
therefore turnout) from a party’s ideological base. While Downs (1957) tells us parties use 
platforms only for the former, the ‘extended party network’ (EPN) theory of parties, and a 
variety of anecdotal evidence, suggest parties regularly use conventions and platforms for the 
latter. We contend that platforms can be tools for either, depending on group characteristics. 
We seek to further the understanding of the relationship between groups and parties by 
exploring their interaction during the platform-drafting process. We hypothesize conditions 
under which parties respond to organized groups, and test these expectations using platform-
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drafting hearing testimony. Using automated text analysis we find evidence of parties negotiating 
with groups for inclusion in their coalition. We find political parties responding to organized 
groups that show loyalty and ideological similarity to the mainstream of the party, but no 
evidence that parties bend to those with greater resources.  
Our work contributes to and furthers our knowledge of the party-group interaction 
empirically, theoretically, and substantively. Empirically, we utilize exclusive transcripts of 
platform hearing testimony given to the Democratic Party in 1996, 2000, and 2004. These data 
are not public, and are unavailable to the academic community except through our research. 
They provide a window into the direct negotiations between parties and groups. Rather than 
being restricted to insights inferred from observational data, we have empirical evidence of the 
interaction between these potential coalition partners.  
We also employ recent methodological advances in the form of automated text analysis. 
This technique is relatively new and commonly utilized by a select group of scholars of 
comparative party preferences (Laver et al 2003; Slapin & Proksch 2008). By employing these 
tools to scale differences in platform text with automated text analysis, we facilitate the 
discussion between Comparative and American Politics. 
Theoretically, our findings help advance debate on the birth-order of parties and groups 
(e.g. which came first?). We provide an important update to the group-party literature by 
demonstrating that money and resources are less influential in group-party relationships than one 
might expect. We also speak to ongoing concerns raised in popular literature about the corruptive 
power of wealthy groups on political action. Our results are consistent with recent evidence that 
shows ideas precede parties (Noel 2014) and our findings dampen heightened anxiety that 
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political parties are purchased by highest bidders. Instead, we show that loyalty to a party gains 
more attention than absolute dollars.  
Substantively, we demonstrate how party platforms can matter to both parties and groups. 
Though criticized for lacking efficacy (Truman 1993) or embodying ‘nothing more than the 
momentary sentiments of a majority of party activists,’ (Rozell et al 2006), the very fact that 
groups mobilize to testify at platform hearings indicates that American party platforms are 
valuable. Platforms may not be the most important documents in American history, but they are 
possibly the single most representative document of group influences on the central parties.  
 
Political parties and organized interests 
Scholars often conceptualize organized interests as groups external to political parties. 
Thought of as natural combatants in some instances, or ‘symbiotic adversaries’ (Fine 1994) in 
others, their goals may vacillate between competing and complimentary. More recent research 
re-conceptualizes this framework by acknowledging that political parties are ultimately, at least 
in part, comprised of organized interests (Bawn et al 2012; Cohen et al 2008; Karol 2009; Noel 
2014). In this view parties are loose coalitions of intense policy demanders who seek some 
common goal (Masket 2016). Prior work has established the overlapping individual 
memberships of groups and parties as ranging from intertwined to indistinguishable (Grossmann 
& Dominguez 2009; Heaney et al 2012; Herrnson 2009; Koger et al 2009; Kolodny & Dwyre 
1998; Skinner et al 2012). 
Our idea of a dynamic negotiation between parties and groups is consistent with the 
Extended Party Network (EPN) theory, which assumes parties are comprised of groups. (Noel 
2014) argues that parties and ideologies are distinct but related phenomena, where ‘parties 
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choose the ‘who’ that they unite by considering what those people want’ (24). Ultimately, a 
party’s primary objective is to maximize the number of seats won in a given election. A party 
therefore strategizes to create a coalition that will maximize the probability of attaining that goal.  
Organized interests, on the other hand, have multiple goals, and success is often self-
defined and dynamic (Brunell 2005). Groups demonstrate partisan affiliation (Koger et al 2009; 
Koger et al 2010) with respect to legislative activity (Grossmann & Dominguez 2009; Masket 
2011) and candidate selection (Cohen et al 2008; Miller & Schofield, 2003). Some groups seek 
specific policy implementation, and would be unsatisfied with anything less than policy or social 
change. Other groups, however, may be pleased with the opportunity to voice, to clearly and 
vigorously express, their preferred policies; taking advantage of the opportunity to be heard 
would be sufficient cause for celebration.  
What does this mean about the interaction between parties and groups? A group’s ability 
to mobilize and convince blocks of individual votes gives that group bargaining leverage with 
the party and its positioning (Harvey 1998; Miller & Schofield 2003; Truman 1993). A group 
can promise to support a party or candidate, or to mobilize out-group voters in supplement to the 
party campaign (Esterling 2007). A group might also credibly threaten to exit a two-party 
system, either by not voting, or by voting for a third party. These organized groups of ideological 
thinkers have little reason to compromise (Noel 2014). 
Parties, meanwhile, have many incentives to compromise. One party’s calculus can 
change from one election to the next, and it is not uncommon for parties to change issue 
positions over time. Karol (2009), for example, explains how US Democrats and Republicans 
switched positions on trade policy in the 20th Century because party leaders valued organized 
labor as coalition partners more than they valued a consistent position on trade. (Wolbrecht 
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2000) shows that the parties switched positions on women’s issues during the same time period 
largely because of the groups included in each party’s coalition—women for Democrats, and 
religious conservatives for Republicans. In both cases, parties opted to maintain coalitions by 
changing policy positions. 
This literature suggests elasticity in party coalitions, with organized groups moving in 
and out. We see bargaining across issues and groups where coalitions (e.g. parties) and their 
potential partners negotiate about which interests (e.g. groups) to include and which issues to 
favor. Party leaders settle on an arrangement of interests that maximizes the ability to win 
elections. This process is fluid, and results in party coalitions that change between election 
cycles. We suspect it does so in predictable ways. 
 
Why platforms? 
The platform-drafting process is only one element of party building, and some regard it 
as entirely symbolic. The extant literature on the value of party platforms in the United States 
contradictorily finds platforms to be both vapid (Truman 1993) and useful (Maisel 1993; Pomper 
& Lederman 1980; Snyder & Ting 2002). We argue that it is a suitable juncture at which to 
examine group-party coalition formation for several reasons.  
First, the platform-drafting process is time and labor intensive for both parties and 
groups. In 2004, for example, the Democratic Party’s platform-writing process spanned six 
months and four cities. It began with the appointment of a small Platform Drafting Committee, 
which drafted an initial document. Any individual or group could submit statements, comments, 
or requests to testify in response to the document (Democratic National Convention 2004). An 
official Platform Committee, made up of party leaders and ‘rising stars,’ then conducted hearings 
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in Portland, OR, Baton Rouge, LA, and Santa Fe, NM. Ultimately 193 entities from around the 
country testified in person at the hearings.ii  The Committee then revised the platform and 
submitted it to the full Convention for discussion, debate, and adoption by delegate vote. 
This activity highlights the utility of platform drafting to parties and groups, which is the 
second reason for our focus. Groups see platforms as a tool to voice interests and broadcast 
preferences nationally, while parties use platforms to bargain with groups for the ultimate 
electoral prize: votes. Rozell, Wilcox, and Franz argue groups ‘assign symbolic importance to 
the creation of platforms,’ and ‘believe that candidates do ultimately heed platforms to some 
degree’ (2012: 46-8). They support their view with evidence from 2008, when the Republican 
platform offered immigration and abortion positions more conservative than McCain’s and 
included his name only once, due to group influence (Rozell et al 2012). 
Finally, platform drafting is a direct and observable negotiation between those drafting an 
official statement of the party and those seeking to influence that statement. It demonstrates the 
bargaining process leading to a party coalition, wherein groups commit support in exchange for 
interest articulation, and party leaders offer platform input based on the ability to deliver votes. 
Whether resulting in policy change or not, the interaction captures the behavior of ‘intense policy 
demanders’ (Bawn et al., 2012; Cohen et al 2008), those who have a strong preference for 
particular policy outcomes and, in this case, influence over platform creation. 
 
Hypotheses 
We assume that parties are instrumental and strategic about building coalitions, and that 
parties are dominated by elites who drive their broad decision processes. We theorize that parties 
court groups into their coalition in an attempt to maximize votes in an election. If we consider 
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parties and groups to be related, overlapping, and perhaps even wholly enmeshed, we can think 
of the negotiation over platform content as a strategic game. The final outcome (i.e. the platform) 
is a Nash Equilibrium representing each entities’ best response to the other (see Reinhardt & 
Victor 2013). These observations beg our question: under what conditions will a party include a 
group in its coalition via the party platform? Based on the above insights we see three 
characteristics of groups as critical determinants of the final outcome: party loyalty, ideological 
proximity, and group resources.  
First, we expect parties to include groups that can either promise or mobilize voters 
(Adkins & Dowdle 2004). Groups with a large membership base or substantial financial 
resources (Gilens 2012; Schattschneider 1975) may find it easier to mobilize large numbers of 
voters. We therefore expect that all else being equal parties will seek to incorporate more 
resourceful groups into their coalitions. 
H1: Groups with greater resources for mobilization are more likely to be included 
in the party coalition than groups with fewer resources. 
Second, Karol (2009) and Wolbrecht (2000) show that parties are willing to shift issue 
positions to appeal to loyal groups. Those groups that have expressed interest in a variety of 
parties across time may not be able to compel one party to switch positions, while consistently 
loyal groups may be more likely to persuade a party to reconsider its position. We therefore 
expect parties to reward and protect groups showing loyalty to their coalition, as opposed to that 
of another party.  
H2: Groups that display greater loyalty towards one party are more likely to be 
included in the party coalition than groups that show less loyalty. 
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Third, the basic Downsian model emphasizes the importance of spatial proximity (Downs 
1957). Groups are not likely to seek out party coalitions ideologically distant from their ideal 
point, and parties are unlikely to court groups ideologically opposite from the rest of the party 
coalition. We therefore expect parties to seek to include those groups in their coalition that are 
nearest to the median position of the party coalition. While that median point may shift as groups 
move in and out of the coalition, all else being equal we expect the probability of a group being 
included in a party’s coalition to increase as the ideological distance between the party median 
and the group median declines.iii  
H3: Groups with median ideology closer to the existing party coalition median are 
more likely to be included in the party coalition than groups that are ideologically 
more distant.  
 
Data and methods  
Platform hearings provide a venue for groups to articulate their views of the party 
platform, and offer an excellent source from which to estimate the positions of groups trying to 
influence platform creation.iv Our unit of analysis is a group-year, accounting for each group that 
testified at a DNC platform hearing in 1996, 2000, or 2004 (N=80). Our empirical strategy is to 
examine what groups request, and compare this to what parties produce in platform negotiations. 
We expect to systematically explain the group interests that are incorporated into the party 
coalition (platform) using group ideology, loyalty, and resources. 
Our dependent variable is the overlap between the group’s testimony and the final DNC 
platform. We derive this by analyzing the content of the testimonies and platform using 
Wordscores, described fully below (Laver et al 2003). Our data includes the complete population 
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of groups that jockeyed for platform position during these three election cycles; however, groups 
that do not participate are unobserved. We therefore note that our data has a selection bias and do 
not draw inference on the population of all groups, but only those in a position to be included by 
parties in the first place. While this limits our inference, our approach increases our 
understanding of the competition for party attention among this class of groups, which has not 
been previously understood. 
 
Using text as data 
We began with the full (hardcopy) texts of the Democratic Party platform hearings from 
1996, 2000, and 2004.v  We digitized the information into plain text, extracting testimony and 
question responses for each participating interest group. We obtained the full text of final party 
platforms from the websites of the DNC and RNC.  
Analyzing text to proxy actors’ positions relative to one another generally includes two 
possible strategies. One approach is to hand code text. This strategy involves developing a series 
of categories and codes from the substance of the text and using humans to apply codes to 
segments of the text. Error can be minimized by using inter-coder reliability checks, though the 
increase in reliability comes with increases in labor costs as well (see for example Budge 2001a, 
2001b).  
An alternative approach is to use computer-assisted coding. This strategy involves some 
human coding to develop categories and codes on a sample of text, and then using software to 
apply these codes to remaining text. It allows one researcher to code large quantities of text (see 
for example (Laver & Garry 2000). Each of these modes of text analysis involves tradeoffs. 
Generally, the researcher trades some measurement error in exchange for efficiency.  
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A third strategy is computer-assisted text analysis. Developed by Laver, Benoit, and 
Garry (2003), it does not treat text as substantive prose meant to be dissected, analyzed, and 
comprehended. Rather, these scholars approach text with naïve agnosticism and assume that 
individual words, and short strings of words, convey information. Their approach treats texts as a 
chaotic ‘bag of words’ where information about speakers’ positions is contained in the frequency 
of word choice, rather than in the meaningful substance of sentences and paragraphs. This 
strategy is efficient and reliable. The approach is easy to implement, fully replicable, and not 
prone to measurement error, or to human coding error or variance. It does, however trade some 
precision and nuance in favor of efficiency and replicability.  
Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003) argue that one can ascertain the policy positions of 
political actors by analyzing texts the actors have written. They show that treating text as data for 
the purpose of revealing actor’s policy positions is sometimes advantageous over alternatives. 
For example, let’s say one seeks to evaluate congressional policy preferences. Legislative roll 
call voting indicates one’s choice from dichotomous options, but is only observed at the end of a 
long process, and likely masks strategic behavior. Alternatively, one might use surveys or 
interviews, but costly methods can include measurement error due to participant guardedness. 
Analyzing the texts produced by political actors can provide an objective, easy to replicate, 
inexpensive, and transportable metric of actors’ policy positions.  
There are two key requirements to make the Laver, et al. approach work. First, the 
technique requires a known and quantified ‘reference text’ against which to measure all other 
texts. The reference text must have a known position in ideological space. The original research 
on this technique, for example, uses the Comparative Manifestos Project, which hand-codes 
multiple party manifestoes in several countries to develop a common ideological score for each. 
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This score, and the word frequencies associated with it, act as a quantitative anchor from which 
to compare new unscored ‘virgin’ documents about which no ideological information is known. 
The algorithm in this technique, known as Wordscores, compares the word frequencies in the 
virgin text to those in the previously-scored reference text to produce a score for the virgin text. 
Therefore, a known, verifiable, meaningful, and quantifiable score for the reference text is 
fundamentally necessary. 
Second, the texts used in Wordscores must be appropriate texts for the technique in that 
they can be interpreted on a common spatial scale. Such a scale is common in the study of 
politics, legislatures, and parties where for several decades scholars have used Euclidean 
distances to estimate ideological positions. In such cases the technique is flexible enough to 
analyze texts and actors such as activists, judges, commentators, bloggers, lobbyists, legislators, 
candidates, etc. Yet one would be misadvised to compare a party manifesto to a series of 
appliance manuals.  
We employ the Wordscores technique for three reasons. First, party platforms provide 
known and quantified reference texts to which we can compare the ‘virgin’ texts of interest 
group platform testimonies. Since groups try to influence the platform the texts have a direct 
relationship. Second, the texts we have are appropriate. It is common to quantify party platforms 
and to assume that they can be placed in a Euclidean ideological space. It is equally common to 
assume that political actors, such as those that represent organized interests, can be placed in a 
similar space. Third, we are ultimately only interested in estimating the overlap in policy 
positions between the party and groups and have no expectations regarding specific planks or 
policies. We seek efficiency, accuracy, and scientific replicability over substantive nuance of 
particular groups’ requests. Wordscores therefore provides the best option for evaluating our 
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expectations about the conditions under which parties will incorporate group interests into their 
platforms. 
More technically, we give Wordscores two collections of reference texts—a series of 
Democratic Party platforms (from 1996, 2000, and 2004) and a series of Republican Party 
Platforms (from 1996, 2000, and 2004). We concatenate each party’s platforms into one 
document, yielding one Democratic reference text and one Republican reference text. Next we 
provide an a priori score to these reference documents of -1 (Democrat) and 1 (Republican), akin 
to the scale commonly used in ideological space.vi   
The algorithm in Wordscores observes a word (or two-word or three-word clusters, 
depending on the parameters provided) in a reference text and calculates the probability that the 
word came from a particular reference text based on word frequencies. This probability is 
multiplied by the a priori ideological anchoring score we provide, and the result is a ‘score’ for 
each word in the reference texts. Then we can compare individual words in the virgin texts to the 
scored words in the reference texts using the same logical procedure. First, the software 
calculates the relative frequency of each word in the virgin texts, and multiplies that frequency 
by the weighted score of the word from the reference texts. An overall wordscore for the entire 
virgin text is then the average weighted scores of its words. For our purposes, individual words 
uttered by testifiers are weighted and aggregated to produce a testimony score that places the 
group in the same ideological policy space as the party platform (see Appendix A for a technical 
description of Wordscores). As Laver, et al (2003) state: 
Scoring words in this way replaces the predefined deterministic coding dictionary 
of traditional computer-coding techniques. It gives words policy scores, not 
having determined or even considered their meanings in advance but, instead, by 
treating words purely as data associated with a set of reference texts whose policy 
positions can be confidently estimated or assumed (313). 
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If we take the pre-defined ideological or policy space score of the reference texts as meaningful, 
the Wordscores technique allows us to use the frequency with which groups used particular 
words to estimate party proximity without evaluating their meaning or intent. 
A skeptical reader may question the wisdom of stripping words of meaning and 
calculating organizational policy positions based on word frequencies. Yet counter-intuitively, 
the blindness of this technique gives us confidence in its estimates. The procedure is immune to 
bias, personal interpretations, preset expectations, or other cognitive limitations of human 
coding, which makes our work both replicable and falsifiable. We therefore accept the trade-offs. 
The Wordscores technique has been utilized (Baum & Zhukov 2012) and criticized 
(Lowe 2008). A primary critique is that Wordscores generates outputs that do not have 
interpretable magnitude. This is a serious shortcoming, if interested in generating point 
estimates. In our case, however, we seek only to draw an inference on the relationship between 
group inclusion in a party platform and the characteristics of a group that are predictive of its 
inclusion. Wordscores provides us the invaluable tool of quantifying party and group interests in 
a single space, with information about the relative positions of each player rather than the 
magnitude of causal effects.vii 
 
Dependent Variable 
To calculate the extent to which an interest group is included in the platform, we use the 
transformed Wordscore for each group-year as an indication of group proximity to the 
Democratic and Republican platforms. Values closer to -1 are nearer the Democratic platforms, 
while those closer to 1 are nearer the Republicans’ platforms. We make this calculation on 
15 
 
‘unigrams,’ or the overlap in single words, as well as ‘bigrams,’ and ‘trigrams,’ the overlap in 
groups of two and three words, respectively. The literature suggests that counting small groups 
of words, rather than single words, provides a greater degree of sensitivity of overlap between 
texts; however, one must tradeoff degrees of freedom and power to make this exchange. Figures 
1A and 1B show the relative positions of the groups in our sample to the party platforms for 
unigrams (Figure 1A) and bigrams (Figure 1B). The reader may notice the DNC position (at -1) 
and the RNC position (at 1), which more or less splits the population into thirds, with most 
groups falling between the two parties. There is similarity between the arrangements of groups 
between the two figures, giving us confidence in the method. 
[Figures 1A, 1B] 
Substantively, the transformed Wordscore value for each group represents the group’s proximity 
to each party, or the extent to which each party included the group’s interests in their platforms, 
as measured by the overlap in word frequencies. The arrangement of groups along this scale 
shows a reasonable left-right logic. On the left we see traditional Democratic groups such as 
labor unions and civil rights organizations, while on the right we see veterans’ organizations and 
business interests. Table 1 shows the summary breakdown of the texts used to create the figures. 
[Table 1] 
 
Independent Variables 
Interest group ideology is operationalized using Bonica's (2014) measure of group 
ideology. This score is developed from observations of campaign contribution behavior from 
groups, PACs, and associated individuals (e.g. employees), and has been shown to provide a 
good approximation of group ideology. We must accept some missingness to use this variable 
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because not all of our group testifiers appear in the Bonica data (Table 2 offers summary 
statistics).  
In measuring groups’ resources we seek an indicator of potential to mobilize voters. We 
create a standardized index for each group based on two characteristics known to affect their 
ability to mobilize voters (Kollman 1998): number of members and reported budget. Each 
measure is standardized among groups, summed, and standardized again. Formally, resources is 
the sum of the standardized count of the number of members a group has and the group’s 
standardized budget. The sum is standardized again: 
 = 	
	
 + 	
, 
where: Mt  is the reported number of members in the group in electoral cycle t, Bt is the group’s 
reported budget in cycle t, and std redistributes the variable to a standard Normal distribution.  
We measure loyalty as the percentage of campaign contributions made by each group’s 
Political Action Committee, or by individual employees of the group, to the Democratic Party 
during the two-year campaign cycle of the testimony. We weight the percentage by the total 
amount of money the group gave to Democratic candidates in the same cycle, and take the 
natural log of the result. Most of the testifying groups give heavily to Democrats. Twenty-four 
have no PAC or employee contributions tracked by the Federal Elections Commission. Formally: 
	 =    ∗  , 
where: Ct is the total contributions made by a group in cycle t, CDt is the group’s total 
contributions to Democratic candidates in cycle t, A is the total amount donated.viii 
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Loyalty and ideology are both derived from campaign contribution behavior, though this 
should not cause concern. While the initial data is the same, the algorithms convert the observed 
behavior into two different metrics. They are correlated at r = 0.2. 
  
[Table 2] 
  
Results and Analysis 
We estimate a linear regression model. We cluster the error term on groups, as several 
groups are represented multiple times in this short cross-sectional time series. With 80 
observationsix spanning three time periods, (N=80, T=3), our data do not fit the T>N restriction 
desired for standard cross-sectional time series analysis (Beck & Katz 1995). We therefore insert 
time-wise fixed effects for each platform year, excluding 1996, the reference year (appropriate 
for short panels, see (Arellano 2003; Wooldridge 2010). We estimate standard errors with 
bootstrapping because our dependent variable is itself the product of an estimation procedure. 
The statistical model is:x 
!	"#	%&' = ( + )*%
+&	,+' + )-	' + ).' +
)/0'1 + )20'3 + 4'   
[Table 3] 
We estimate this model separately for unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams (Table 3 provides 
results).  
We note that the unigram and bigram models perform similarly to each other, while the 
trigram model performs poorly. We suspect the increased sensitivity of the trigram is not worth 
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the sacrifice of statistical power, so we focus instead on the bigram model (Model 2), combining 
statistical power and sensitivity.  
We find no support for H1 that group resources will be positively associated with 
platform inclusion. Though unexpected, this finding is consistent with previous research 
suggesting that group monetary resources are not particularly predictive of group behavior or 
success (McKay 2012). Moreover, it suggests that parties do not necessarily rely on constituent 
groups for external voter mobilization. This may be because parties have sophisticated internal 
machineries using micro targeting and ‘smart’ campaigning (Issenberg 2013). The platform 
drafting process and coalition building between parties and groups either sits external to this 
process, occurs in a different timeframe, or remains unobserved using our methods. Either way, 
our finding dampens concerns about groups buying their way into the Democratic Party’s favor.  
Loyalty is negative (-0.775) and statistically significant (p<0.01) in Model 2. Results for 
loyalty are thus consistent with our expectation (H2) that groups showing more loyalty to the 
Democratic Party are more likely to be included in the Democratic platform (recall that inclusion 
is represented by a transformed Wordscore nearer to the Democratic platform (-1)).  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on Ideological Congruence is 
consistent with our expectation (H3) that groups ideologically closer to the party’s status quo 
position are more likely to be included in the platform. Recall that the dependent variable and 
ideology are measured on the same scale (-1, 1), which is equivalent to (Poole & Rosenthal, 
2011) NOMINATE scales. The coefficient is positive, relatively large given the distribution of 
the data (1.1), and statistically significant (p<0.05). 
 
Discussion   
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We have used the Wordscores technique to gauge the relative positions of parties and 
groups, and to engage in a basic test of our hypotheses. From our results, we infer that ideology 
and loyalty are significant predictors of group inclusion in a party coalition (as measured by the 
platform), while resources are not. Overall, our analysis casts a shadow on the role of group 
resources in influencing party platforms, though we do not interpret these findings to suggest 
generally that group resources do not influence party behavior. 
Our inference is limited in three important ways. First, we have temporal and ideological 
limitations because our specialized data includes only the Democratic Party’s platform drafting 
process in 1996, 2000, and 2004. In addition to being denied access to Republican platform 
testimony in 1996-2004, both parties changed their platform drafting process in 2008, so 
comparable data for later elections does not exist.   
Second, our sample only includes groups that testified before the platform drafting 
committee, who are presumably a subset of groups who requested to testify. It is likely that the 
Democratic Party would seek input from their most loyal activists, and if so, our loyalty measure 
is biased due to the sample on which we make observations. We have no information on groups 
that might have sought to influence the process but were not granted access, and it is possible 
that well-funded groups influenced the process without testifying at the hearings.  
Yet these are limitations of the research design, not of the empirical model. We have 
opted to utilize this rare and valuable data to gain insight into the Democratic Party’s process 
during the time period under study, and to conduct an analysis with novel and superior measures 
of group-party interactions. Even with limitations, our results show that among testifying groups, 
group resources do not predict inclusion in a platform, while group loyalty does. 
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Third, we have limited ability to substantively interpret coefficients or relative 
magnitudes. The substantial transformation of text to data is compelling because it allows us to 
quantify a previously unmeasured process, but also somewhat dissatisfying because the values of 
the measures are not necessarily substantively meaningful. If one is persuaded by the critiques, a 
downside of our empirical strategy is that we cannot reasonably interpret the relative size of the 
effects of group characteristics on platforms—only whether such associations exist.  
We measure the groups of policy demanders who attempt to join the party coalition 
through the platform-drafting mechanism. Limitations notwithstanding, our work represents the 
first systematic window into this closed-door interaction between groups and parties. Our 
approach allows us to measure the characteristics of groups that seek to become part of a party 
coalition in a given election cycle. The opportunity to observe and directly compare organized 
groups’ requests about the party and its platform to the final document is unique and valuable.  
Our results suggest that groups and parties engage in a strategic interaction to negotiate a 
platform, where the platform represents the aggregation of group policy interests that dictate a 
party organization’s agenda in a given election cycle. By analyzing the population of testifying 
groups, and identifying the characteristics of those with successfully articulated interests, we 
provide a creative and conservative test of how groups achieve interest articulation in party 
platforms. Testifying groups that demonstrate higher degrees of party loyalty through campaign 
contributions, and those with ideological preferences closer to the party, are more likely to see 
their interests articulated in the platform. 
Conclusions 
We set out to investigate party-group coalition building during the platform-drafting 
process. We develop three testable expectations: (1) parties reward loyal interest groups with 
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platform inclusion, (2) parties seek to include groups that are ideologically near the existing 
party median, and (3) parties are more likely to reward groups that have greater resources to 
mobilize voters. Our text analysis of party platforms helps probe the make-up of the final 
coalition of ‘policy demanders’. Our evidence furthers extended party network (EPN) theory’s 
view that parties represent extended coalitions of organized interests and that these interests 
jockey with one another to build a party coalition during each election cycle. 
We use unique data to generate these results. Automated text analysis of the transcripts 
from three cycles of testimony provided to the DNC’s platform writing committee helps 
determine how much congruence there is between what groups request and what they receive in 
the final platform. Word frequencies and Wordscores technology produce reasonable estimates 
of overlap between groups and parties. Our empirical findings generally support our 
expectations: groups ideologically closer to the party, and those more loyal to the party, are more 
likely to be included in the platform. 
Substantively, our paper offers first steps toward a greater understanding of party 
platforms, often thought to be useless, and neglected in the agenda of American politics. If 
parties use platforms to mobilize voters vis-à-vis interest groups, the study of those platforms 
and the groups participating in their construction has implications for the analysis of networks 
and party-building (Koger et al 2009). Can weakly connected groups use platform-drafting 
hearings to gain better network positions? Do the relative connections between groups and 
parties predict meaningful behavior from parties (e.g. which candidates to nominate) and groups 
(e.g. which candidates to support financially)? Platform-drafting politics can provide insight into 
broader cleavages within a party that may reveal new insights about party positions, candidate 
strategies, and policy goals.  
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Despite shortcomings in our research design, we offer two clear, consistent findings:  
political party platforms are responsive to organized interests that are ideologically similar to the 
party status quo, and to those who have demonstrated loyalty to the party. Moreover, the 
composition of parties changes across time in systematic ways. We look to future scholarship to 
improve our ability to measure group actions, incentives, and resources with respect to parties. 
 
                                                 
i
 The authors contributed equally to this paper. Special thanks to Julia Azari, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Randall 
Calvert, Kevin Esterling, Will Everett, Elisabeth Gerber, Zachary Greene, Seth Masket, Richard Skinner, Jonathan 
Slapin, and participants at the 2008 Visions in Methodology conference for suggestions and feedback.   
ii This number differs from our N (below) because it includes elected officials, private citizens, and individuals 
representing organizations that are not organized interests. 
iii
 We acknowledge the potential for conditional effects among the three variables. Rather than fully develop theory 
and expectations here, we report exploratory statistical results in Appendix B and find no statistically significant 
interaction effects. 
iv
 We assume groups reveal sincere preferences in their hearing testimony. 
v
 The Republican National Committee denied us access to their hearing testimony. 
vi
 We also estimated models with un-concatenated platforms and Comparative Manifestos Project scores for each 
party-year. Those models are not substantively different from the models below, which we present because the 
concatenated reference texts include a larger corpus of words and generate more precise estimates. 
vii
 While there is no way to verify that parties directly adopt groups’ demands, a direct link between group requests 
and party drafting is not necessary for our purpose. If the final platform draft more closely mirrors the requests of 
Group X over Group Y, the party is more inclusive of Group X than Group Y. 
viii
 PAC data for 1996 were not available so in those cases we used contribution data from 1998. 
ix
 Due to missingness in the covariates, n<80; we employ casewise deletion rather than imputation. 
x
 The models are robust to variations in specification.  
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Table 1 Summary of Texts 
Year 
DNC 
Platform 
word count 
RNC 
Platform 
word count 
Number of 
Groups 
Group 
Testimony 
Average 
Unigrams 
(percent 
scored) 
Group 
Testimony 
Average 
Bigrams 
(percent 
scored) 
Group 
Testimony 
Average 
Trigrams 
(percent 
scored) 
1996 18,032 27,160 24 
800 
(95%) 
454 
(54%) 
132 
(16%) 
2000 23,964 34,503 26 
852 
(93%) 
458 
(50%) 
132 
(15%) 
2004 17,821 42,076 30 
1332 
(94%) 
712 
(51%) 
199 
(15%) 
TOTAL 59,817 103,739 80 
1016 
(94%) 
288 
(52%) 
157 
(15%) 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Mean 
(Standard 
Dev.) Range Definition Source 
Platform 
Inclusion- 
Unigrams 
(DV1) 
0.0185 
(1.41) (-2.7 – 3.43) 
Transformed Wordscores 
values, where DNC (-1) 
and RNC (1) platforms, 
concatenated for 1996, 
2000, 2004 are reference 
texts, and group 
testimonies are virgin texts. 
Interest group testimony to 
DNC platform drafting 
committees and texts of 1996, 
2000, and 2004 DNC and RNC 
platforms. 
Platform 
Inclusion - 
Bigrams 
(DV2) 
0.0199 
(1.41) (-2.6 – 4.2) 
Transformed Wordscores 
values, where DNC (-1) 
and RNC (1) platforms, 
concatenated for 1996, 
2000, 2004 are reference 
texts, and group 
testimonies are virgin texts. 
Interest group testimony to 
DNC platform drafting 
committees and texts of 1996, 
2000, and 2004 DNC and RNC 
platforms. 
Ideology -0.437 (0.597) -1.19 – 1.02 
Ideological spatial position 
estimated from campaign 
contributions of group’s 
PAC or donations of its 
members. 
Adam Bonica Database on 
Ideology, Money in Politics, 
and Elections (2013) 
Loyalty 10.6 (3.02) 5.3 – 14.6 
The natural log of the sum 
of all donations made to 
candidates by the group’s 
PAC or its employees, 
multiplied by the 
percentage of donations 
made to Democrats. 
Federal Election Commission 
campaign contribution data, as 
compiled by Opensecrets.org 
Resources 0 (1) -0.75 – 5.2 
Standardized index for 
each group based on two 
characteristics known to 
affect their ability to 
mobilize voters (Kollman 
1998): number of members 
and reported budget. Each 
measure is standardized 
among groups, then 
summed and standardized 
again. 
Galenet’s Encyclopedia of 
Associations (1996, 2000, 
2004); Colgate, National Trade 
and Professional Associations 
of the United States (1996, 
2000); Gale Encyclopedia of 
Business and Professional 
Associations 1996-7; 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
Public Interest Group Profiles 
(1996-7, 2000-1); GuideStar 
(2008); Foundation Center 
(2008); Associations Unlimited 
(2008); OpenSecrets.org 
(2008); Campaign Money 
(2008); the Federal Elections 
Commission (2008); groups’ 
webpages and archived 
webpage.  
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Table 3 Linear Regression Results 
 
 
Unigrams Bigrams Trigrams
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ideology (-1 = D/+1 = R) 0.907* 1.116** 0.988**
(-0.372) (-0.341) (-0.317)
Dem. Loyalty -0.882*** -0.775*** -0.435
(-0.247) (-0.178) (-0.260)
Resources 0.34 0.317 0.069
(-0.284) (-0.198) (-0.222)
Year 2000 0.078 -0.133 -0.338
(-0.460) (-0.407) (-0.490)
Year 2004 0.597 0.443 0.049
(-0.416) (-0.513) (-0.507)
Constant 0.027 0.373 0.566
(-0.371) (-0.387) (-0.321)
Adj R-squared 0.266 0.283 0.178
N 46 46 46
Pr (Chi) 0.000 0.000 0.019
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on groups in parentheses.
Regression Estimates for Interest Group Wordscores 
Relative to Party Platforms (-1 = Dem / +1 = Repub)
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A m e r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  T e a c h e r s
F a m i l i e s  U S A
A m e r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  T e a c h e r s
N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  P o l i c e  O r g a n i z a t i o n s
N a t i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( N E A )
A n t i t e r r o r i s m  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t  R e s p o n s e  T r a i n i n g …
N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  C h i l d r e n ' s  H o s p i t a l s
A m e r i c a n s  D i s a b l e d  f o r  A c c e s s i b l e  P u b l i c  T r a n s i t …
A m e r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  S t a t e ,  C o u n t y ,  a n d …
D e m o c r a t i c  L e a d e r s h i p  C o u n c i l
D N C
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  M a c h i n i s t s
A m e r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  L a b o r - C o n g r e s s  o f …
H u m a n  R i g h t s  C a m p a i g n
A r a b - A m e r i c a n  I n s t i t u t e
A m e r i c a n s  f o r  D e m o c r a t i c  A c t i o n
I n d u s t r i a l  U n i o n  C o u n s e l ,  A F L - C I O
N a t i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( N E A )
B r e a d  f o r  t h e  W o r l d
N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s  D e f e n s e  C o u n c i l
Y o u t h B u i l d  U S A
H e a l t h  A c t i o n  N e w  M e x i c o
U n i t e d  F o o d  a n d  C o m m e r c i a l  W o r k e r s
A r a b  C o m m u n i t y  C e n t e r  f o r  E c o n o m i c  a n d  S o c i a l …
U n i t e d  S t e e l w o r k e r s  o f  A m e r i c a
N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  o f  W o m e n ' s  O r g a n i z a t i o n s
A m e r i c a n  N u r s e s  A s s o c i a t i o n
C o a l i t i o n  f o r  C l e a n  A i r  A c t
P e o p l e  o f  C o l o r  A i d s  F o u n d a t i o n
H u m a n  R i g h t s  C a m p a i g n
P l a n n e d  P a r e n t h o o d  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  A m e r i c a
A m e r i c a n  A c a d e m y  o f  P e d i a t r i c s
N a t i o n a l  A b o r t i o n  a n d  R e p r o d u c t i v e  R i g h t s  A c t i o n …
N a t i o n a l  C o a l i t i o n  o n  H e a l t h  C a r e
N a t i o n a l  S t o n e w a l l  D e m o c r a t s
A m e r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  S t a t e ,  C o u n t y ,  a n d …
P o l l y  K l a a s  F o u n d a t i o n
N a t i o n a l  M e d i c a l  A s s o c i a t i o n
A m e r i c a n  H o s p i t a l  A s s o c i a t i o n
P r o g r e s s i v e  P o l i c y  I n s t i t u t e
N a t i o n a l  A b o r t i o n  a n d  R e p r o d u c t i v e  R i g h t s  A c t i o n …
N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  o f  S e n i o r  C i t i z e n s
A m e r i c a n  C i v i l  L i b e r t i e s  U n i o n  ( A C L U )
C a p i t o l  A r e a  F o o d  B a n k  o f  T e x a s
N a t i o n a l  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  C h u r c h e s
K a n s a s  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  H o m e  C a r e
A m e r i c a n  H o s p i t a l  A s s o c i a t i o n
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  F i r e  F i g h t e r s
A m e r i c a n  O s t e o p a t h i c  A s s o c i a t i o n
A m e r i c a n  N u r s e s  A s s o c i a t i o n
A m e r i c a n  A u t o m o b i l e  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( A A A )
A m e r i c a n  G a s  A s s o c i a t i o n
N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  H o m e b u i l d e r s
N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  H o m e  B u i l d e r s
A r m e n i a n  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e
R N C
A m e r i c a n s  f o r  D e m o c r a t i c  A c t i o n
A m e r i c a n  H o s p i t a l  A s s o c i a t i o n
D i s a b l e d  A m e r i c a n  V e t e r a n s
B u s i n e s s  R o u n d t a b l e
I B E W  U t i l i t y  D e p a r t m e n t
R o c k y  M o u n t a i n  F a r m e r s  U n i o n
N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  H o m e  B u i l d e r s
D i s a b l e d  A m e r i c a n  V e t e r a n s
N a t i o n a l  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  H o m e l e s s  V e t e r a n s
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  D e f e n s e  F u n d
A m e r i c a n  J e w i s h  C o m m i t t e e
I l l i n o i s  F a r m e r s  U n i o n
A n t i - D e f a m a t i o n  L e a g u e
V e t e r a n s  o f  F o r e i g n  W a r s
A m e r i c a n  J e w i s h  C o m m i t t e e
A m e r i c a n  I r o n  a n d  S t e e l  I n s t i t u t e
A m e r i c a n  L e g i o n
J o i n t  B a l t i c  A m e r i c a n  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e
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Appendix A: Wordscores Technical Information 
 
The Wordscores technique begins by using known information about a set of reference texts, R, 
and each reference text’s (r) known dimensions, d. In our case, the known reference texts are 
party platforms for Democrats and Republicans from various years, and their known dimensions 
are each platform’s exogenously assigned ideological score from the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (dr). Wordscores calculates the frequency of each word stem (Fwr), as a proportion of the 
total number of words in the reference text, r. Given a set of reference texts, one can then 
compute the probability that any given word (w) is from a particular reference text (r): !|6 =
789
∑789		, called Pwr. Next, Wordscores uses this probability to calculate a weighted average score 
for each word in the reference texts: ;
|6 = 	∑!<= ∗ 
<, called Swd. Then, Wordscores 
calculates the proportional word frequencies (Fwv) in the ‘virgin’ texts to be analyzed using the 
same technique as with the reference texts. For us, the virgin texts are group testimony and 
mission statements. Each word in a virgin text, v, is assigned a score by multiplying the word 
frequency (Fwv) by the dimensional weight, Swd. The score for the entire text, Svd, is simply the 
average of all the individual weighted word scores: ;>? =	∑@=> ∗ 	;=?. This number 
represents the expected position of the virgin text on the known dimension of the reference text. 
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Appendix B:  Results of interactive models 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Ideology (-1 = D/+1 = R) 0.902* 0.757 0.875** 1.112** 1.190** 1.077** 0.928** 1.009* 0.961**
(-0.354) (-0.537) (-0.309) (-0.344) (-0.369) (-0.357) (-0.360) (-0.416) (-0.317)
Dem. Loyalty -0.918* -0.876*** -0.822** -0.801* -0.778*** -0.704* -0.859 -0.436 -0.384
(-0.401) (-0.239) (-0.278) (-0.405) (-0.203) (-0.309) (-0.481) (-0.231) (-0.424)
Resources 0.337 -0.041 0.452 0.315 0.506 0.451 0.033 0.122 0.165
(-0.351) (-0.897) (-0.331) (-0.219) (-1.027) (-0.336) (-0.283) (-0.762) (-0.375)
Year 2000 0.085 0.068 0.065 -0.128 -0.128 -0.15 -0.256 -0.336 -0.35
(-0.398) (-0.420) (-0.501) (-0.363) (-0.383) (-0.368) (-0.382) (-0.472) (-0.534)
Year 2004 0.607* 0.591 0.516 0.45 0.446 0.346 0.167 0.05 -0.02
(-0.268 (-0.392) (-0.518) (-0.325) (-0.465) (-0.399) (-0.504) (-0.471) (-0.442)
Loyalty X Ideology -0.056 -0.041 -0.657
(-0.444) (-0.462) (-0.524)
Resources X Ideology -0.522 0.259 0.072
(-1.203) (-1.364) (-1.032)
Resources X Loyalty -0.127 -0.152 -0.108
(-0.266) (-0.318) (-0.375)
Constant 0.019 -0.068 0.102 0.367 0.419 0.463 0.475 0.579 0.631
(-0.340) (-0.497) (-0.390) (-0.293) (-0.323) (-0.264) (-0.393) (-0.302) (-0.367)
Adj R-squared 0.248 0.253 0.256 0.265 0.266 0.277 0.19 0.157 0.163
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Pr (Chi) 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.022
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on groups in parentheses.
Regression Estimates for Interest Group Wordscores Relative to Party Platforms (-1 = Dem / +1 = Repub)
Unigrams Bigrams Trigrams
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